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THE LAKE CHELAN CASE-
ANOTHER VIEW
Edward A. Rauscher *
Professor Corker's analysis' of Wilbour v. Gallagher2-the Lake
Chelan case-was published recently in this Review. This rejoinder
states a view contrary to that of Professor Corker with respect to both
the law of tidelands and shorelands in lakes which, unlike Lake
Chelan, fluctuate only naturally, and the effect of the Lake Chelan
case upon that body of law.
The original Lake Chelan opinion decided, briefly, that public
rights incident to navigation prevent an owner from filling lands which
have been periodically submerged by artificial fluctuations in the lake's
level. The decision was not addressed to, and appears not to have
considered, the situation of tidelands or shorelands in general. These
issues were not discussed either in briefs or oral argument at that
stage. Nevertheless, the court's general reference to "navigable waters"
was regarded by Professor Corker as announcing a rule applicable to
all tidelands and shorelands in the state. Others, including public
officials, came to share Professor Corker's view of the Lake Chelan
case and gave wide publicity to their views, with the result that much
of the public, and many lawyers, apparently have accepted that
position without realizing the possibility of respectable argument to the
contrary. Largely in response to this view of the case, several amici
curiae, myself included, proposed that without regard to the merits
of Wilbour v. Gallagher itself, the court indicate upon rehearing that
the decision was not to be understood as applying either to tidelands
or to shorelands in lakes not subject to artificial fluctuation. This, and
the argument of other amici who opposed rehearing, was the first
instance of the court's attention being directed to the case's possible
* Member of Seattle and Washington State Bar Associations. BA., Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, 1942; LL.B., Yale University, 1948. The writer is counsel for, and a principal of, a
group that owns and plans to develop tidelands in Puget Sound. He writes this response
in that capacity, and in the spirit of an advocate.
1. Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public Permission-Washing-
tons Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WAsir. L. Rav. 65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Corker].
2. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969).
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relevance to tidelands and shorelands. The court's denial of rehearing,
on the usual form and without explanation or comment, can be under-
stood only as indicative of a normal unwillingness to dispose of a
different class of cases not before it. In fact, one amicus opposed
rehearing on that very ground, while at the same time urging a broad
interpretation of the opinion. My own conclusion is that the court has
not ruled, even impliedly, on the decision's relevance to submerged
lands other than the narrow type involved in Wilbour v. Gallagher, and
that it will so rule only when it is presented with an appropriate case.
The Supreme Court may, some day, accept Professor Corker's thesis
of the impermissibility in general of developing private lands underly-
ing navigable waters in Washington. However, it has not done so in
Wilbour v. Gallagher. And before it does, it will have to weigh a large
body of law to the contrary, which Professor Corker has not really
discussed and which was brought to the court's attention only by amici
at the rehearing petition stage.
Let me first define the area of disagreement. Professor Corker and I
are each in favor of conservation, the protection of our marine environ-
ment and ecology, and vigorous and adequate programs to foster and
promote these interests. Disagreement does not commence there. With
respect to areas beyond the line of extreme low tide in tidelands or
beyond the line of navigability in lakes and rivers, no one contests the
ownership of either the land beneath the water, the water itself, or the
control of the water. That is all in the state.3 Nor has any issue been
raised with respect to nonnavigable lakes and streams. Except in such
highly unusual cases as Wilbour v. Gallagher, there will be no relevant
dispute as to uplands. And I doubt that Professor Corker and I would
disagree as to the extent of the public's rights in lands remaining in the
public domain. Rather, the focus of our disagreement concerns certain
tidelands (land between the line of ordinary high tide and either the
line of extreme low tide or the inner harbor line in tidal areas)4 and
3. Moreover, all that follows in this article should be understood as recognizing the
paramount federal navigational servitude, wherever that might apply.
4. The outer boundary of second-class tidelands is the line of extreme low tide. WAsH.
REv. CODE § 79.01.024 (1959). The outer boundary of first-class tidelands is either the
line of extreme low tide (in the case of such lands lying between one and two miles from
the corporate limits of a city) or the inner harbor line (in the case of such lands within or
in front of such corporate limits, or within one mile thereof). WAsn. REv. CODE § 79.01.
020 (1959). In both cases the upland boundary is the line of ordinary high tide, except
524
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shorelands (land between the line of ordinary high water and the line
of navigability in lakes and rivers) 5-- specifically those tidelands and
shorelands which have passed into private ownership by sale from the
state for money. Actually tidelands and shorelands constitute a rela-
tively small portion of lands underlying tidal waters, navigable rivers
and lakes, and only a small, though valuable, portion of those tidelands
and shorelands are in private ownership. Specifically, our disagreement
is whether privately owned tidelands and shorelands are, as Professor
Corker urges, precluded from development by Wilbour v. Gallagher.6
That decision is probably not, as Professor Corker suggests, the
ultimate judicial confrontation between public and private rights in
navigable waters. Rather, it is a unique and very narrow decision, in-
volving (1) an artificial raising of a lake (2) without the customary
acquisition of the fee in the land being flooded, and for which the flow-
age right ran to a power company and not to the public at large.
Gallagher's predecessor in title was the power company which caused
Lake Chelan to be artificially raised, and the Supreme Court's opinion
relies substantially upon foreign authorities which, under like circum-
stances, found implied dedications of the higher water levels-a doctrine
which, by definition, cannot apply to submerged lands subject only to
tidal and other wholly natural fluctuations. In addition, the owner,
Gallagher, was putting the filled land to a use regarded by many
as objectionable in a single-family residential area. The record sug-
gests that the use of his filled land was polluting the lake water. Prior
to the raising of the lake level, Gallagher's predecessor had owned
where a federal patent of uplands prior to statehood conveyed to the meander line and the
meander line was below the line of ordinary high tide. The inner harbor line is defined as
"a line located and established in navigable tidal waters between the line of ordinary high
tide and the outer harbor line and constituting the inner boundary of the harbor area."
XVAS H. R V. CODE § 79.01.016 (1959).
S. First- and second-class shorelands, those bordering the shores of navigable lakes or
rivers which are not subject to tidal flow, lie "between the line of ordinary high water
and the line of navigability." WAsHr. REv. CODE §§ 79.01.028, 79.01.032.
6. It is difficult to tell whether Professor Corker is saying that this is the law or that it
will become the law in the wake of Wilbour v. Gallagher. The title of his article, the lead
paragraph, and his statement of the holding ("ownership of lands beneath navigable
waters does not give the owner a right to restrict use of those waters for all the public
purposes to which they are suited." Corker, supra note 1, at 68) all suggest that
Wilbour v. Gallagher is a great decision because it decides that private ownership of lands
underlying all navigable waters is so restricted. Yet he recognizes elsewhere that the deci-
sion has not really gone this far: "A major legal problem still unresolved is the extent to
which the state has, by selling tide- or shorelands, already expressly or impliedly autho-
rized its grantees to fill these lands." Corker, id. at 72.
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neither land adjacent to the lake nor any shorelands in the lake.
Finally, without intending to criticize counsel or attempting to explain
any omissions,- neither the facts nor the law presented were adequate
for proper disposition of the case before the court, much less the larger
issue which Professor Corker attributes to the opinion.'
In contrast to the limited facts presented by Wilbour, consider the
nature of private ownership of shorelands and tidelands in Washington
and its historical and legal development. When Washington became a
state, it assumed sole and absolute ownership of all tidelands and shore-
7. See note 24, infra, re the case being contested principally on a theory of pre-
scription.
S. E.g., the record does not disclose the important fact that the defendants Gallagher had
a lease from the state to use the shorelands abutting the property in dispute, and that the
lease would have permitted filling and the other uses which the court said were precluded
in Gallagher's lots by the existence of public rights. All nine justices seemed to feel that
the filling and use of the dedicated streets was wrongful, but it apparently was not brought
to their attention that the streets, after being filled, were only used as streets, not as a
trailer court, and that Gallagher had a permit from the Town of Chelan to fill them. An
awareness of this might have affected the decision, since the reserved right to use the
streets might well permit their use only as a means of access to the lake, rather than as a
part of the lake itself. Query whether if the grade of these streets had ever been fixed,
abutting owners would have had inverse condemnation rights resulting from any change
in grade. The parties to the case tried it primarily on the basis of prescriptive rights. There
was no discussion, in either the trial court or the Supreme Court, of the case's relevance
to tidal areas. The law that was cited had very little relevance to these other waters, and
the opinion relies exclusively upon authorities from other states, whose patterns of owner-
ship and rights in land underlying navigable bodies of water are markedly different from
ours. In one of the cases cited, Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437 (1923), the
New York Court of Appeals noted that the use of foreign law in this area is not very
reliable. 142 N.E. at 440. Justice Hill's concern with the absence of public representation
is understandable; just as significant was the absence of representation by other interested
persons. Even the parties to the case apparently did not realize that their suit presented
such broad issues. They did not present the law relevant to these larger questions, and
neither did anyone else; and, quite naturally, the court appears not to have considered it.
One indication that the court did not contemplate that its holding would apply generally
to privately owned tidelands and shorelands is found at the beginning of its analysis:
"there was no private ownership of the land under Lake Chelan in its natural state, and
no right to obstruct navigation." 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 314, 462 P.2d 237. By definition
there is private ownership of land under a lake to the extent that shorelands are privately
owned. Gallagher did not own shorelands in front of the land in question, but public
records disclose that there are privately owned shorelands elsewhere on Lake Chelan. It
might be assumed that the court was referring only to the land in front of Gallagher's
property, or that it was erroneously referring to all of Lake Chelan simply because no
one had called its attention to the privately owned shorelands. But it cannot be assumed
that the court was denying the fact of private ownership of lands underlying all navigable
waters everywhere in the state, or that it was enunciating a rule which would be co-
extensive with such an assumption and applicable to all such waters. In fact, there is no
justification for the belief that the court felt it was addressing itself to anything beyond
the case presented and other similar situations on Lake Chelan. The decision probably is
not even applicable to all of Lake Chelan. Query as to its effect on a person whose prop-
erty runs to the water at both the raised and lowered level, and who, in addition, owns
shorelands.
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lands within its boundaries.' Quite in keeping with any inalienable
responsibility on the part of the state to preserve the public's naviga-
tion rights, a very considerable body of law, constitutional and legisla-
tive in origin, decades of administrative practice and an unbroken line
of judicial decisions have shaped and defined the character of private
ownership of shorelands and tidelands in Washington. At some time or
other the state has executed tide and shoreland leases, licenses and
conveyances of almost every conceivable stripe and description. With
respect to these, our Supreme Court has voiced clear and explicit recog-
nition not only that the state can, as in many cases it did, convey fee
simple absolute title to these tide and shorelands, but also that such
conveyances are an expression of the state's policy to encourage devel-
opment of such lands.10
The Washington Supreme Court has clearly not deemed the rights
derived from private ownership of tide or shorelands to be of the rather
flimsy nature suggested by Professor Corker. In Puget Mill Co. v.
State, the Court stated:"
The decisions of this court lead to no other conclusion than that the state
9. E.g., Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); Harkins v. Del
Pozzi, 50 Wn. 2d 237, 240, 310 P.2d 532, 535 (1957); Van Siclen v. Muir, 46 Wash. 38, 42,
89 P. 188, 189 (1907) ; Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 244-45, 26 P. 539, 541 (1891).
The state's assertion of ownership in Article XVII, Section 1 of the Washington Constitu-
tion relates to "the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state ... " and is subject
to the disclaimer, in Article XVII, Section 2, of swamp and tidelands patented by the
United States.
10. Those who sat in the constitutional convention, and those who met in our early
legislative assemblies, were confronted with an important problem when treating
the subject of tide and shore lands. Many insisted that the state should reserve
title and that the land should never be sold. Others maintained that the best in-
terests of the state demanded that they pass into private ownership, thus becoming
a subject of taxation and revenue to the state. The latter theory prevailed, subject
to the qualification that the harbor area should never be disposed of. The state
has invited investment in these lands upon the theory that, in private ownership, all
lands lying back of the inner harbor line or the line of ordinary navigability would
be reclaimed and put to useful purposes.
State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 171, 135 P. 1035, 1040 (1913). See also Boyer v.
State, 19 Wn. 2d 134, 142 P.2d 250 (1943) ; Globe Mill Co. v. Bellingham Bay Imp. Co.,
10 Wash. 458, 38 P. 1112 (1895). One of the clearest expressions of state policy to
encourage development was the Tide and Shore-lands Act of 1890, which provided that
one who had made improvements on tidelands for use in commerce, trade or business
had a preferential right to purchase such lands, and that his preferential right was
prior to that of the upland owner. Act of March 26, 1890, §11, Wash. Laws of 1889-90,
at 502.
11. 93 Wash. 128, 134-35, 160 P. 310, 313 (1916).
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authorities have the power to, and when conveying [second-class tide and
shore lands] by deeds absolute in form do, vest in the grantees an absolute
fee simple title to such lands. [citations omitted.]
This being the nature of the plaintiffs' titles, it is elementary constitutional
law that such titles cannot be impaired by any act of the state after making
the deeds upon which they rest.
In Palmer v. Peterson," the state's grantee of tidal oyster lands sued
to enjoin trespass over the tidelands either upon foot or by boat. In
affirming judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the court said: 3
It is lastly contended that inasmuch as the tide lands in controversy are
covered by water to a depth of seven or eight feet at high tide, such waters
are navigable, and the appellant has a lawful right to pass over the same,
notwithstanding the title of the respondents. This contention cannot be
sustained. The state deed is absolute in form, and carries with it the right
to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the lands granted, ...that
such a grant was within the competency of the state cannot, at this late
day, be controverted.
12. 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909). As an imaginative afterthought to his endorsement
of minimizing uncertainties in the future development of the law, Professor Corker suggests
that this worthy judicial technique is somehow served by the court's forbearing to over-
rule two cases, Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891), and Palmer v. Peter-
son, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909), where that forbearance does not otherwise comport
with his interpretation of Wilbour v. Gallagher. Corker, supra note 1, at 66 n.5 and
accompanying text. The court in Wilbour is said to have treated the Eisenbach case "with
silence" and, what is more, that it was wise in doing so. Every indication, however, is
that the court, never having considered Eisenbach, did not treat it at all. See note 8,
supra. Without belaboring the extent of an oyster-land lessee's right to possession, Pro-
fessor Corker's attempted limitation of Palmer v. Peterson in light of the Lake Chelan
case simply begs the question whether the latter applies to tidal areas, which the court did
not have before it, did not discuss, and very likely did not consider. Moreover, his asser-
tion that the "exclusive possession" doctrine of the Palmer case met its demise in Kemp v.
Peterson, 47 Wn. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955) is extremely dubious since the Kemp case
did not involve or present any issue of incursion of the public's right to fish in navigable
waters against private interests in lands underlying navigable bodies of water. The public's
right to fish navigable waters, subject to the state's authority to license and regulate, was
presumably acknowledged even before the Palmer case in 1909; certainly it was not first
recognized in the Kemp case. Moreover, that public right, as against an upland owner's
interference with its exercise, was not said in Kemp to follow, ipso jure, a finding of
navigability; rather, it was based on the state's ownership of the navigable river beds
under Article XVII of the Washington Constitution. Thus, the public right may still be
limited by a conveyance from the state to the line of navigibility.
13. 56 Wash. at 75-76, 105 P. at 180.
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After discussing with approval the Illinois Central case on which Pro-
fessor Corker relies,' 4 the Palmer court concluded: 15
The conveyance by the state of tide lands covered and uncovered by the
flow and ebb of the tide is not a substantial impairment of the interest of
the public in the navigable waters of the state, and does not interfere with
the paramount right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the. several states. [citations omitted.]
The language of the court in the Puget Mill and Palmer cases, and
in the leading case of State v. Sturtevant,6 is entirely consistent with
Washington's historic treatment of tidelands and shorelands. Private
ownership and development of such lands and the public's right of
navigation (including rights corollary to the right of navigation) have
never been regarded as impinging on each other." The reason for this
is not that the state has failed to assert a public trust in, or to preserve,
the public's navigation rights; it is rather that the state has con-
14. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The passage from that opinion
cited by Professor Corker (supra note 1, at 75) applied only to a legislative grant,
later repealed, from the State of Illinois to the Illinois Central Railroad, of lands lying
easterly of the City of Chicago and one mile into Lake Michigan, a quantity of land
which exceeded three times the area of Chicago's entire harbor. 146 U.S. at 454. This, the
Court observed, was a very real and extensive threat to navigation, which interfered with
the development and anticipated expansion of the Chicago harbor, and was equated with a
grant by the state of "lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of
a sea or like." Id. at 452-53. In this respect, the rule of Illinois Central simply implies that
the State of Washington could not convey Elliot Bay. Other lands, those extending two
hundred feet from the shore, which were reclaimed by the railroad and on which
permanent improvements were made, were said not to interfere "with any useful freedom
in the use of the waters of the lake for commerce, foreign, interstate or domestic ...
and cannot be regarded as such an encroachment upon the domain of the State as to
require the interposition of the court for their removal or for any restraint in their use.!
Id. at 444. Finally, as to certain piers erected by the railroad, the Court remanded the
case for a determination whether they extended into the lake "beyond the point of prac-
tical navigability, having reference to the manner in which commerce in vessels is con-
ducted on the lake; and, if it be determined upon such investigation that said piers,
or any of them, do not extend beyond such point, then that the title and possession of
the railroad company shall be affirmed by the court ... ." Id. at 464. The Court thus
expressly recognized vested private property rights within the line of "practical naviga-
bility," and rejected the interpretation that all lands underlying navigable bodies of
water, including portions thereof which are not themselves navigable, are inappropriate
for private ownership or impressed with the public trust upon which another aspect of
Illinois Central turned. That interpretation of Illinois Central has been adopted by the
Washington Supreme Court. Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909). See also
Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272, 278 (1916); United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrig. Co., 184 U.S. 416, 424 (1902) ; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 45 (1894).
15. 56 Wash. at 76, 105 P. at 180.
16. 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913).
17. See, e.g., Sequim. Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 131-33, 94 P. 922 (1908).
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sistently determined that the private and public rights meet at, and are
delineated by the inner harbor line or the line of extreme low tide (tide-
lands) or the line of navigability (shorelands) ,1 a demarcation which
would rebut any suggestion that all portions of navigable bodies of
water, including those which are not themselves navigable and pre-
sumably to the high water mark, are now to be regarded as naviga-
ble. 9
18. E.g., State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913) ; Palmer v. Peterson, 56
Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909). This principle was not overlooked by the court in Wilbour
v. Gallagher. "There undoubtedly are places on the shore of the lake where develop-
ments, such as those of the defendants, would be desirable and appropriate. This presents
a problem for the interested public authorities and perhaps could be solved by the
establishment of harbor lines in certain areas within which fills could be made, together
with carefully planned zoning by appropriate authorities to preserve for the people of
this state the lake's navigational and recreational possibilities." 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at
318 n.13, 462 P.2d at 239 n.13.
Like many another legal principle, this one should not be stated without its possible
qualifications. For example, ownership of tidelands, like ownership of other lands
through which navigable waters can flow, may be subject to rights of navigation. In
Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 75 P. 807 (1904), the court abated a tideland
owner's obstruction of a navigable channel, which ran adjacent to the plaintiff's lands
and through the defendant's tidelands to its mouth in Bellingham Bay. The channel was
four miles long to the point of its mouth, from which it extended another mile and a
half into the Bay, and was the plaintiff's sole means of access to the Bay. The court
found the channel to be navigable for general commercial purposes and that it had been
so used for at least twenty years prior to its obstruction by the defendant. In view of
Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909), which was decided only five years
later, the Dawson case must be understood as relating only to such channels as are
navigable for general commercial purposes, and not to suggest that tidelands generally
and smaller channels or sloughs therein are to be regarded as navigable. See also Strand
v. State, 16 Wn. 2d 107, 123-28, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943) ; State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158,
165, 135 P. 1035, 1037 (1913) (shorelands). Consistent with the Dawson case, a
navigable stream which empties within the boundaries of privately owned tidelands
probably cannot be obstructed. In this respect the tideland owner is in no different
position from one whose dry lands are traversed by a stream, to which he may own the
bed and which is subject to the limited navigation right of transporting timber
products. See, e.g., Monroe Mill Co. v. Mensel, 35 Wash. 487, 494-95, 497-98, 77 P. 813,
815-16 (1904). In the absence of a navigable stream or channel, the plaintiff in the
Dawson case would, under the rule of Esenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 253, 26 P.
539, 543-44 (1891), have had no right of access to Bellingham Bay, unless, perhaps,
on the basis of some other principle, such as prescription. As its facts would indicate, the
Dawson case has been interpreted as having particular reference to the right of an upland
owner to use a navigable channel as a means of access to deep water. See State ex rel
Ham v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 442, 452, 126 P. 945, 949 (1912). Smith v. Centralia,
55 Wash. 573, 575, 104 P. 797, 798 (1909).
19. See note 14, supra. It is doubtful that rights which may be recognized as incidental
to the right of navigation, such as swimming, boating and fishing, extend to parts of
navigable bodies of water which are not themselves navigable and, therefore, are not
subject to the primary navigational servitude. See Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105
P. 179 (1909). See also Nelson v. DeLong, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342, 347 (1942),
upon which the majority in Wilbour v. Gallagher relied. One other point is relevant
here: Professor Corker's reference to the public's problems of access to navigable
waters if the right to "traverse the surface . . . [were to terminate] at the natural high
530
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Professor Corker feels that it was a mistake for the state to have sold
tidelands and shorelands.20 He may be right. But the fact is that the
state did sell them, with authority and without reservation, and it is
now too late to nullify those conveyances by asserting that they were
subject to extended public rights incident to navigation, such that they
now cannot be developed by filling. The state has used the money
realized upon sale of those lands; public bodies have levied property
taxes on them and on occasion have foreclosed and resold them for tax
delinquencies. Thousands of acres of such lands have already been
developed, with improvements valued in the high millions. For ex-
ample, Harbor Island rests on filled tidelands, as do hundreds of highly
developed acres surrounding it. The shoreline of Elliot Bay in down-
town Seattle used to lie between First and Second Avenues, and the
Norton Building is thus partly situated on filled tidelands. These are
just a few examples.21
I concede that the state, earlier in its history, could have reserved
more tidelands and shorelands for public enjoyment, that it could have
preserved the riparian rights of upland owners in navigable waters,
and that it might still do either with respect to such lands which have
not yet passed into private ownership. But the wisdom of the policy
which the state in fact has adopted22 is neither relevant to the Wilbour
case nor susceptible of treatment in the space available. If a mistake in
policy was made, it was one which had no, or only the most tenuous,
relation to navigation, and it cannot be rectified now by resort to that
doctrine. If the public is now to acquire rights in privately owned
tidelands or shorelands, it must do so by such constitutionally sanc-
water line" (Corker, supra note 1, at 69) ignores the fact that such waters may be bounded
by privately owned property at either the outboard or inboard boundaries of shorelands
or tidelands, and the problems of access would be the same in either event.
20. Corker, supra note 1, at 85.
21. Professor Corker suggests that tide and shoreland improvements may have been
lawful when made. Corker, supra note 1, at 86. While he recognizes some equities favoring
private owners who, prior to the Wilbour case, had made such improvements, he char-
acterizes the interests of those who simply owned shore or tidelands as of that date as
"mere expectations." Id. at 74. These expectations, though, evidently were shared by
the state. See language from State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 P. 1035 (1913), note
10 supra, which, as another example of this sort of expectation, was referred to in a 1966
opinion letter from the City of Seattle Law Department to the City Planning Commis-
sion in regard to a proposed regulation of tideland development. See also Jones v. Hammer,
143 Wash. 525, 255 P. 955 (1927).
22. See note 10, supra.
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tioned means as eminent domain, 23 grant from the owner, and prescrip-
tion.2
When Palmer v. Peterson was decided in 1909, it was already
thought to be too late to overturn the established lines between the
right of navigation and private ownership of tidelands and shorelands
derived from the state; 21 manifestly that cannot be done now.
The Supreme Court should not be understood as having undertaken
such upheaval in Wilbour v. Gallagher, certainly not without discus-
sion of the authorities which have brought us to our present position
or some attention to the private acquisitions of tidelands and shore-
lands and developments undertaken in reliance on them. Such an inter-
pretation is particularly strained in view of the court's express recogni-
tion of how the result might be affected by the simple demarcation of
harbor lines in Lake Chelan.2" The more reasonable conclusion is that
the court in Lake Chelan decided only the narrow case before it, that
it will consider the situation of tidelands and shorelands only when
23. Professor Corker's reasoning from the Illinois Central case, 146 U.S. 387 (1892),
that lands underlying "public waters . . . cannot be the subject of constitutionally
vested property rights," apparently would not deny that appropriation of such lands
for public use requires exercise of the power of eminent domain. Corker, supra note 1,
at 75. The Court in Illinois Central recognized that even the expenses of improving lands
lying beyond the line of navigability, where those expenses were incurred in reliance
upon a grant of those lands from the state, ought to be compensable. 146 U.S. at 455.
That case does not suggest that exercise of the power of eminent domain would be
unnecessary as to lands inside the line of navigability. Moreover, in this state, a taking of
improvements on such lands (Boyer v. State, 19 Wn. 2d 134, 142 P.2d 250 (1943) (leased
lands)) and preferential rights to purchase the same (State ex rel. Wilson v. Grays
Harbor & Puget Sound R.R., 60 Wash. 32, 110 P. 676 (1910)) do require compensation.
Further, ownership of such lands carries the right to enjoin trespass thereon in either
their dry or submerged state. Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909). Cf.,
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294
(1967), which indicated that the state could not defeat the constitutional prohibition
against taking property without just compensation by a simple judicial declaration that
such property, theretofore recognized, never existed after all. Id. at 296-97.
24. The facts in Wilbour v. Gallagher, which was argued largely on the basis of prescrip-
tion, would not have given rise to prescriptive rights under the standards established by
the Washington Supreme Court. Three judges made this point in a separate, essentially
dissenting, opinion. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 321, 462 P.2d 232, 241 (1969). The majority
opinion stated that the plaintiffs had made an excellent case for prescription (Id. at 314,
462 P.2d at 237), but did not say whether it was good enough. Professor Corker did not
feel that the plaintiffs had made a case for prescription. Corker, supra note 1, at 81-82.
25. Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 76, 105 P. 179, 180 (1909).
26. See note 18, supra. In the case of second-class and some first-class tidelands, the
outer boundary is the line of extreme low tide, so no formal demarcation is necessary.
Moreover, lines of navigability, the outer boundaries of shorelands, exist in an inchoate
sense even when such lines have not been formally demarcated. See, e.g., State v.
Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 165-66, 135 P. 1035, 1037-38 (1913).
532
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that issue is appropriately presented, and that the opinion evidences
no inclination to overrule established principles defining the character
of private ownership of such lands in Washington.
533
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